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Can Compulsory Military Service Raise Civilian Wages?
Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal
By David Card and Ana Rute Cardoso
We provide new evidence on the long-term impacts of peacetime
conscription, using longitudinal data for Portuguese men born in
1967. These men were inducted at age 21, allowing us to use pre-
conscription wages to control for ability dierences between con-
scripts and non-conscripts. We nd a signicant 4-5 percentage
point impact of service on the wages of men with only primary ed-
ucation, coupled with a zero eect for men with higher education.
The eect for less-educated men suggests that mandatory service
can be a valuable experience for those who might otherwise spend
their careers in low-level jobs.
JEL: J31, J24
Keywords: military conscription; longitudinal earnings; quasi-
dierences; sensitivity analysis
Throughout the 20th Century young men in most Western countries faced the
risk of military conscription. Although compulsory service ended in the U.S.
in 1973, the practice continued until very recently in many European nations,
and is still widely used around the world.1 Spurred in part by recent decisions
to end conscription in Sweden, Italy, France, and Germany, there is renewed
interest in understanding the impacts of mandatory service on a wide range of
outcomes, including earnings (Angrist and Chen, 2011; Angrist, Chen, and Song,
2011; Grenet, Hart and Roberts, 2011; Paloyo, 2010), education (Maurin and
Xenogiani, 2007; Cipollone and Rosolia, 2007; Keller, Poutvaara and Wagener,
2010; Bauer et al., forthcoming), health (Bedard and Deschenes, 2006; Dobkin
and Shabani, 2009; Autor, Duggan and Lyle, 2011), and crime (Galiani, Rossi
and Schargrodsky, 2011).
Revealed preference arguments suggest that conscripts will suer economic
losses from coerced service (e.g., Oi, 1967). Nevertheless, some analysts have ar-
gued that compulsory service can have a positive return for disadvantaged youth
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who face limited civilian job opportunities (e.g., Berger and Hirsch, 1983; de Tray,
1982).2 Seminal research by Angrist (1990) showed that Vietnam-era draftees had
lower earnings than non-draftees, a nding he attributed to the low value of mil-
itary experience in the civilian labor market. Subsequent research in the U.S.
and other countries, however, has uncovered a surprisingly mixed pattern of im-
pacts. Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) found that 10 years after conscription
Dutch veterans earned lower wages than those who avoided service. In contrast,
Albrecht et al. (1999) estimated a positive earnings premium for Swedish con-
scripts. Grenet, Hart and Roberts (2011) nd no long-run impact on the wages
of British conscripts; likewise, Bauer et al. (forthcoming) nd no eect for West
German conscripts.3 In a recent re-analysis of the Vietnam-era draftees, An-
grist and Chen (2011) nd that by age 50 they have about the same earnings as
non-draftees, and slightly higher education.
In this paper we present new evidence on the long-run eects of mandatory
military service, using detailed longitudinal data for Portuguese men born in the
late 1960s. Some 40 percent of the men in these cohorts served in the military:
a majority entered the service with less than 6 years of formal schooling. Our
analysis relies on a unique annual census of wages { the Quadros de Pessoal (QP)
{ that allows us to track the cohorts of interest from their initial entry into the
labor market until their early forties. Using the fact that employers were required
to treat conscripted employees as being on leave of absence, we can identify men
who were working just prior to the age of conscription (age 21) and then entered
the military, and a comparison group of men who remained in civilian jobs over
the same period.
Implementing a series of dierence-in-dierences estimators we nd that the
average impact of military service for men who had entered the labor market by
age 21 is positive but insignicantly dierent from zero throughout the period
from 2 to 20 years after their service. This small average eect, however, masks a
statistically signicant later-life impact of about 4-5 percent for men with lower
levels of education (under 6 years of schooling), coupled with a zero-eect for men
with higher education. The positive impact for the less-educated group mirrors
the ndings for U.S. veterans by Berger and Hirsch (1983) and suggests that
mandatory service can be a valuable experience for disadvantaged men who might
otherwise spend their careers in low-level jobs. Our condence in these results is
bolstered by three additional ndings. First, we nd that wages of the men who
eventually served in the military and those who did not track each other very
closely in the period up to age 21. Second, we nd that pre-conscription wages
are a strong predictor of wages 10 to 20 years later, suggesting that any dierences
in average ability between veterans and non-veterans are revealed by their wages
2Hirsh and Mehay (2003) study wage dierences between reservists who have served in active duty
and those who have not, and nd small average dierences, but a positive impact of service for African
Americans.
3Kunze (2002) analyzes longitudinal data for German workers and nds a complex pattern of earnings
premiums for veterans.
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in the period prior to conscription. Third, comparisons of employment rates show
that the veterans converge to the non-veterans within about 6-7 years after the
completion of service, alleviating concerns about possible selection biases.
While our primary focus is on the eect of conscription for men who were
working prior to age 21, an important concern is that conscription could have
had dierent eects on other groups { e.g., those who never worked prior to age
21. As a check we relate average wages for men born in dierent years from
1959 to 1969 to cohort-level data on conscription rates. Consistent with our main
ndings, this analysis points to a small positive average eect of conscription, and
rules out a large negative average eect across all the men in a particular cohort.
The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of the institutional back-
ground underlying the conscription process in Portugal in the late 1980s. Section
II discusses the QP data set and our method for identifying conscripts, based on
unpaid leave-of-absence status. We then provide a comparison of the conscript
and non-conscript groups, as well as other individuals in the birth cohort under
analysis. Section IV presents the details of our statistical approach, which takes
advantage of the availability of pre-conscription earnings data to control for poten-
tial ability dierences between conscripts and non-conscripts. Section V presents
our main ndings, rst using graphical techniques, then using more formal re-
gression models, including models that explore a range of possible values for the
relative eect of unobserved ability in pre-conscription versus post-conscription
earnings. We also explore possible mechanisms driving the enlistment eect. Sec-
tion VI presents our inter-cohort comparisons for men born between 1959 and
1969, while section VII concludes.
I. Military Service in Portugal
During the 1960s and early 1970s Portugal fought colonial wars in Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau staed by a far-reaching conscription system.4
Following the overthrow of the Estado Novo regime in 1974 and the withdrawal
from Africa, the Portuguese military transitioned to a smaller peacetime force.5
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s men were at risk of conscription in the year
they turned 21, and draftees were required to serve for a maximum of 2 years.6
Individuals were called for medical and psychological evaluations in the year they
turned 20. Those judged physically or mentally unt and those convicted of
serious felonies were exempted from service. A tiny fraction of men (some 100 to
300 per year) also met the substantial hurdles to qualify for alternative service
as conscientious objectors (Domingues, 1998). Short-term deferments could be
4By the early 1970s some 8 percent of the Portuguese labor force were in the military (Graham,
1979). A relatively large number of young people { over 100,000 per year in 1970, for example { left the
country illegally to avoid service (Baganha and Marques, 2001, Table 2.10).
5Carrington and de Lima (1996) study the impact of the large number of retornados { Portuguese
nationals who returned at the end of the colonial wars { on labor market conditions in Portugal.
6Information on the terms of service for men who served in the 1980s and 1990s is taken directly
from legal statutes: see the Appendix for a list of these laws.
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granted to students and individuals who were the sole providers for their family,
but options for self-selecting out of service altogether were quite limited.
Over the 1990s a series of laws reduced the age of conscription to 20 (eective
in 1993 for men born in 1973 or later) and reduced the duration of service to
a maximum of 8 months for the 1970 and 1971 birth cohorts, and to 4 months
for those born in 1972 or later. Finally, in 2005, peacetime conscription ended
and the Portuguese military became an all-volunteer force open to both men and
women.
Table 1 presents a variety of data on the conscription system facing Portuguese
men born from 1959 to 1979, including the size of each cohort, the age of deter-
mination of conscription status, the number of men drafted in the year the cohort
reached the age of conscription, the fraction of the cohort who were conscripted,
and their maximum length of service. The conscription rate for men born in the
1960s and 1970s ranged from 30 to 50 percent, with a dip for the 1972 and 1973
cohorts who were both subject to the draft in 1993. Note that unlike the situation
in some European countries, peacetime service in Portugal was far from univer-
sal. Instead, the fraction of men who served in a given cohort was determined
by the manpower needs of the military, the duration of service, and the size of
the cohort.
| Table 1 here |
Once in the military, conscripts with the lowest levels of education could un-
dertake basic skills training while those with higher schooling could undertake
occupational training. Labor laws in Portugal specify that occupational training
acquired in the military is equivalent to civilian training, allowing some conscripts
to accumulate transferable skills.7 Another important piece of legislation required
employers to treat drafted men as "on leave" from their job. This provision may
have discouraged rms from hiring young men until their conscription status was
settled, though as we discuss below we see no evidence of this behavior. For
those who were hired and subsequently drafted, however, it presumably eased the
transition back to civilian life. Finally, conscripts in good standing could re-enlist
for up to 8 years of additional service, though re-enlistment rates were generally
quite low.
II. Data on Earnings and Conscription Status
The Quadros de Pessoal
Our analysis relies on a unique administrative data set, the Quadros de Pessoal
(QP), collected annually by the Ministry of Employment. The QP is a census
of paid workers in the Portuguese private sector: all rms with at least one
7Currently, such equivalence is guaranteed for training in such elds as professional driving, cooking
and bakery, and emergency medical support.
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paid worker are legally obligated to return information on their full roster of
employees, including wages and hours of work during the appropriate reference
week (in March until 1993 and in October since 1994).8 Importantly for our
purposes, during the 1980s and 1990s the QP asked employers to include men on
leave for military duty in their roster. We identify individuals with missing values
for their earnings and hours of work in the reference week as being "on leave".9
A limitation of the data is that government workers { who comprise just under
20 percent of the Portuguese workforce { are excluded from coverage.10 A second
limitation is that the QP provides only a snapshot of labor market outcomes in
each year. Individuals who are unemployed or out of the labor force at the time
of the census have no labor market data for that year. Electronic records from
the QP are available for the period from 1986 to 2009, and include worker and
rm identiers that allow individuals to be tracked over time and across jobs.
Worker-level data are unavailable for 1990 and 2001, creating gaps in the worker
histories in those two years.
Information for employees in the QP includes gender, date of birth, current
educational attainment, occupation, date of hire, base earnings, supplemental
payments, and hours of work. Information on the employer side includes industry
and location of the rm, gross annual revenues, and ownership status. We use an
edited version of the data that has been checked for consistency of the longitudinal
matches (see the Data Appendix). We measure a worker's gross hourly wage by
dividing the sum of the individual's monthly base-wage and other regularly-paid
benets by his or her normal hours of work.11 All wages are deated using the
Consumer Price Index (2009=100). We treat as missing any wage observation
that is below 0.75 of the rst percentile of wages, or above 3 times the 99th
percentile, in the corresponding year. This eliminates a small fraction (about
1 percent) of observations that appear to reect misplaced decimals and similar
gross errors.
Identifying Conscripts
Ideally we could combine information from military records with labor market
data from the QP to study the impacts of service on all veterans, including men
8Firms are required to post their employee rosters and the corresponding salary information in a
public place visible by its workers, helping to ensure the accuracy of the reported information. During
the 1980s there was some under-coverage in the QP, particularly of small rms (Braguinsky, Branstetter
and Regateiro, 2011).
9Firms may also fail to report earnings and hours for other reasons, including long-term illnesses,
strikes, and maternity leave { see Table A.1 in the online Appendix. Unfortunately, the reason for leave
status is not available in the electronic version of the QP.
10Also missing from the employee rosters are contract workers. In recent years such workers have
accounted for a growing share of employment (Rebelo, 2003).
11Reported earnings are net of the employer portion of social security taxes, but include the employee
portion of the tax, currently 11 percent. For a fraction of workers the employer's report of hours appears
to depend on the number of days worked in the survey month, which varies from year to year. All our
models include year eects to control for this variation.
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with no record of employment prior to conscription. Unfortunately, individual
military service records are not available. Thus, we have to infer conscription
status from the observed data in the QP. We focus on men born before 1970
(when the maximum term of service was reduced to 8 months), and make use of
the fact that employers were instructed to report workers who had been drafted
as on leave. A complication is that some of the conscripts in a given year could be
inducted early in the year, before the March date of the QP, and others could be
inducted after the QP was completed. We therefore identify two separate groups
of conscripts: (1) men who are recorded in the QP as working full time in March
of the year they turned 20 years of age, and are "on leave" (i.e., reported with
missing earnings and hours) in the next two years; (2) men who were working
full time in March of the year they turned 21, and were on leave in March in the
next year.12 As a comparison group we use men who were working full time in
March of the year they turned 21 and in March of the following year. These
men could not have been inducted into the military at age 21 and served more
than a year. Note that we are limiting attention to conscripts and non-conscripts
who were working just before or just after reaching the age of 21. This has the
important advantage that we have a full-time wage observation for each person
at (approximately) age 21. For conscripts, the wage is measured just prior to
entering the military at age 20 or 21; for non-conscripts, it is measured in the
year they turn 21.
To implement these denitions we need to limit attention to cohorts that
reached the age of 20 in 1986 or later (the rst year QP data are available).
Moreover, since the QP has a gap in 1990, we cannot use data for cohorts born
in 1968 or 1969, as their status in the years they turned 21 or 22 is unknown.
Given these constraints, we focus on men born in 1967 as our primary cohort of
interest. These men were 18 or 19 at the time of the rst available QP survey in
March 1986 and can be followed continuously for three years until the break in
the data in 1990 (i.e., until March 1989, when they were 21 or 22 years of age).
In particular for this cohort we have at least two years of data on wages prior to
the age at which their conscription status was determined.
Before proceeding further it is important to verify that men born in 1967 who
were working full time at age 20 or 21 and then recorded as on leave were actually
conscripted. While we cannot oer denitive proof, we conducted a series of
comparisons summarized in Figure 1 that we believe are highly supportive of
our assumptions. The upper left hand panel of the gure shows the distribution
of activities in each year of age from 18 to 42 for men born in 1967 who were
observed working full time at either age 20 or 21. Notice that the fraction of the
cohort reported on leave is relatively high for only two years { ages 21 and 22.
Moreover, the total fraction observed working or on leave at ages 21 and 22 is
12As a robustness check we consider relaxing the criteria for the rst subgroup slightly by requiring
that they were employed full time in March of the year they turned 20 and on leave in the next March.
We show below this has very little eect on our results.
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very similar to the fraction observed working at ages 23 and older. This pattern
strongly suggests that leave of absence status is associated with military service.
By comparison, the upper right hand panel shows similar data for women born
in 1967. For women there is no "unusual" spike in the fraction on leave at ages
21 and 22, conrming that the draft is the likely explanation for the high fraction
of men on leave at these ages.
Comparisons with later cohorts of men and women, presented in the middle
and lower panels of the Figure, provide further evidence that most of the men
from the 1967 cohort who were on leave at ages 21-22 were in the military. In the
middle panels we show data for people born in 1977 who were observed working
full time at age 19 or 20. (We adjust the requirement on age to reect the fact
that conscription occurred at age 20 for this cohort). Consistent with the very
short term of military service for this cohort (4 months maximum) we see only
a relatively small rise in the fraction of men classied as on leave at age 20. For
women born in 1977 the patterns look very similar to those of women born 10
years earlier. Finally, in the lower panels of Figure 1 we show data for men and
women born in 1987 who were observed working full time at age 19 or 20. For
this cohort there was no mandatory military service, and reassuringly only a very
small fraction of men are recorded as on leave between the ages of 20 and 22.
Again, the data for women look relatively similar to the data for women born 10
or 20 years earlier.
| Figure 1 here |
While we believe that military service accounts for the unusual spike in the
fraction of 1967 men on leave at ages 21 and 22, some men would obviously
fall into this category even in the absence of conscription. To estimate the "false
positive" rate we tabulated the fractions of men at dierent ages who were working
in the 1988 QP and on leave in 1989. This fraction was 19.0 percent for 21 year
olds, 9.0 percent for 22 year olds, 3.0 percent for 23 year olds, and between 2.7
percent and 3.0 percent for men between the ages of 24 and 30. Comparing 21
year olds to those 23 and older, we infer that about 15 percent of 21-year-olds
were probably on leave for other reasons. This means that simple comparisons
between men identied as conscripts and those identied as non-conscripts will
likely understate the magnitude of the true gap by about 15 percent.
III. The 1967 Birth Cohort: Conscripts, Non-Conscripts, and Others
While we can use employment and leave status information to identify a group
of men born in 1967 who were working just before the determination of their
conscription status and served in the military, and a comparison group who did
not serve, there are many others in the cohort whose draft status is uncertain,
including men with no record of employment by age 21. Table 2 presents some
comparative information on the various subgroups to help contextualize our main
groups of interest.
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Out of the full cohort of approximately 104,000 men born in 1967 (see Table
1), approximately 90 percent are observed as private-sector employees in the
QP at some point between 1986 and 2009. Of these, about 5 percent have some
inconsistency in their data (i.e., a missing or outlier wage observation if employed,
or a problem linking records over time). Deletion of these observations leads to
a sample of 86,909 men born in 1967 and ever observed in the QP with valid
data, summarized in column 1 of Table 2. Given the low schooling attainment
of this cohort (mean completed school at age 35 = 7 years) most of the men
were presumably out of school by age 19. Nevertheless only about one-fth were
working full time at age 20 or 21 and meet the criteria to be potentially used
in our analysis.13 Despite the relatively low fraction working before age 21, the
bottom rows of the table show that 61 percent are observed at least once between
2002 and 2009 (at ages 35-42).
Column 2 shows the characteristics of the entire sample of "early labor market
entrants" (i.e., those who were working full time at age 20 or 21). Interestingly,
the fraction of this subgroup observed in the QP at least once between 2002
and 2009 is very similar to the fraction of the entire cohort observed in that
interval (62 percent versus 61 percent), while the average wages of the early labor
market entrants are about 12 percent lower than the average wage for the entire
cohort. We suspect that most of the dierence is attributable to the relatively
lower schooling of the early labor market entrants. By 2002, their average years
of completed schooling was 5.8 years, versus 7.1 years for the cohort as a whole.
Among the early labor market entrants we identify four subgroups: conscripts
(column 4 of Table 2), who were either working full time in March 1987 and on
leave the next two years, or working full time in March 1988 and on leave the
next year; non-conscripts (column 5), who were working full time in both March
1988 and March 1989; people missing from the QP in 1989 (column 6) who were
presumably unemployed, out of the labor force, or working in the government
sector in March 1989; and nally a fourth residual group (column 7) made up of
men with a variety of employment histories in the period from 1987 to 1989 that
do not t into the other 3 groups. Both the missing and residual groups include
a mix of conscripts and non-conscripts. For example, men who were working full
time in March 1988 but subsequently left that job before entering the military
later in the year would appear in the "missing" group.
Comparisons across columns 4-7 show that the 1986-88 wages of the conscripted
and non-conscripted groups are quite similar, while the wages of the group who are
missing from the 1989 QP are a little lower, and those of the residual group are a
13A concern about the legal requirement that draftees be allowed to return to their job at the end of
their service is that this would discourage employers from hiring men before the age of 21. We conducted
a dierence in dierences analysis of employment rates of men and women at ages 19 and 20 between
cohorts born in 1967 and those born in 1987, testing whether the employment rates of the 1967 cohort
of men were unusually low. This shows a small male  1967 interaction eect (around -1.5 percentage
points) potentially indicating a small discouragement eect in the hiring of men when the draft was in
eect.
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little higher. The conscripts have the highest education levels of the four groups of
early entrants, measured either in the rst year they ever appear in the QP, or in
2002. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the military generally preferred men with
higher literacy and numeracy skills, leading to a systematic under-representation
of the lowest educated men in the conscripted group. Nevertheless, conscripts
and non-conscripts have nearly the same probability of appearing in the QP in
the period from 2002 to 2009, and fairly similar hourly wages. Interestingly, the
group who were missing from the QP in 1989 have a much lower likelihood of
appearing in the data set during 2002-2009, suggesting strong persistence in their
low probability of private-sector employment. The residual group, by comparison,
has about the same likelihood of appearing in the QP in the 2002-2009 period as
the conscripts and non-conscripts.
Finally, column 8 of Table 2 shows data for the men who were not working
full time in either 1987 or 1988. Some of these late labor market entrants were
attending post-secondary schooling at age 20-21. Consistent with this fact, the
fraction of the group with a university degree is relatively high (though still only
8 percent)14, and on average they have two more years of education than the
early labor market entrants. Despite their late entry to the labor market, by mid-
career they are about as likely to appear in the QP as the early entrants group
(61 percent with a wage observation between 2002 and 2009, versus 62 percent for
early entrants as a whole). By this time they also have about 17 percent higher
average wages than the early entrants (mean log wage = 1.71 versus 1.54 for early
entrants), reecting their nearly 2 additional years of schooling.
| Table 2 here |
In the remainder of the paper we mainly focus on comparisons between early
entrants who can be clearly identied as conscripts (column 4 of Table 2) and
those who can be clearly identied as non-conscripts (column 5). In Section V,
however, we present a series of robustness checks in which we consider relaxing the
criteria to be included in the conscript and non-conscript groups, thereby moving
some of the men from the missing and residual categories into these groups. As
we show, plausible changes in the denitions of the two groups have little impact
on our main results. In section VI we use cohort-wide comparisons of wages and
conscription rates for men born from 1959 to 1969 to assess the magnitude of the
conscription eect estimated for the subgroup of early labor market entrants in
1967.
IV. Measuring the Causal Eect of Conscription on Subsequent Earnings
Given the non-random nature of the conscription process facing men born in the
1960s in Portugal, a fundamental concern for our analysis is that unobserved dif-
14A larger share attended college, given that the drop-out rate is approximately 30 percent.
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ferences between veterans and non-veterans will confound our estimate of the ef-
fect of military service. Anecdotal evidence, for example, suggests that many men
were exempted from service for health-related reasons that might also aect their
future wages.15 Since our primary focus in on men who were working full time
just prior to determination of their conscription status, we use pre-conscription
wages to control for ability dierences between veterans and non-veterans. Our
approach is essentially a dierence-in-dierences framework, generalized to allow
the return to unobserved ability to increase with age.
To proceed more formally, let S denote the level of schooling of a given indi-
vidual at the date just before the conscription decision is made. (For notational
simplicity we treat S as a number: in our empirical analysis, however, we measure
education with a set of dummies). We assume that S is a function of a general
measure of ability a and a random error component u1 :
S = f(a) + u1;
where f() is a possibly nonlinear function. Let w0 represent the logarithm of the
hourly wage that is earned by the individual just prior to the determination of
conscription status. We assume that this wage depends on ability, schooling, and
an additive error component 0 that is uncorrelated with schooling:
(1) w0 = a+ 0S + 0:
Note that we have scaled the ability measure by assuming that expected log
wages in period 0 vary 1 for 1 with a (holding constant schooling). Assume that
the probability of being conscripted into the military (indicated by the binary
variable V ) is a general function of ability and schooling, but does not depend on
the transitory error 0 :
pr(V = 1) = h(a; S):
Finally, assume the wage in post-service period t = 1; :::T depends on an additive
function of ability, schooling, enlistment status, and an error component t:
(2) wt =  ta+ tS + tV + t;
where  t > 0 is a loading factor that can vary over time, t represents the causal
eect of military service on wages in period t, and the error term t is assumed
to be uncorrelated with ability, schooling, or veteran status (though t may be
correlated with t j).
If conscription status is correlated with ability, OLS estimation of equation (2)
will lead to a biased estimate of the causal eect t. When  t = 1 this correlation
can be eliminated by comparing the growth rates of wages of veterans and non-
15Tartter (1993) reports that in 1989 one quarter of potential conscripts were deemed physically unt
for service.
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veterans, leading to a dierence-in-dierences specication:
wt   w0 = (t   0)S + tV + t   0:
Though the assumption that unobserved ability has a constant eect on wages
is a natural starting point, a number of studies have found that the return to
ability rises with experience as market participants learn about the true abilities
of dierent individuals.16 Schoenberg (2007, Table 5), for example, shows that the
eect of measured AFQT scores on wages of men in the NLSY roughly doubles
during their rst decade in the labor market, suggesting a value of  t  2 for
t = 10.17
To illustrate the more general case ( t 6= 1), we follow Chamberlain (1982)
and consider the linear projection of unobserved ability on schooling and veteran
status:
a = sS + vV + 
where E[S] = E[V ] = 0: Substituting this equation into (1) and (2) yields the
reduced form system:
w0 = (s + 0)S + vV +  + 0(3)
= bS0S + bV 0V + v0
wt = ( ts + t)S + ( tv + t)V +  t + t(4)
= bStS + bV tV + vt
The reduced form eect of veteran status on pre-conscription wages (bV 0) provides
an estimate of the ability gap between conscripts and non-conscripts, v. The
reduced-form eect in any later period, (bV t); includes the true causal eect t
and a bias term that depends on the ability gap (measured in period 0 units) and
the return to ability in period t. Given estimates of bV 0 and bV t, and a value for
the relative factor loading  t, an unbiased estimate of the causal eect of veteran
status in period t is:
(5) bt = bbV t    bbV 0:
In a "balanced" sample with no missing wage data an identical estimate can be
obtained by forming a quasi-dierence in wages between period t and period 0
16See for example Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). The same point has
arisen in studies that attempt to use income measured at a certain point as a proxy for permanent income
{ see Haider and Solon (2006).
17Similar analyses have also been conducted using the same data set by Lange (2007), and Arcidiacono,
Bayer and Hizmo (2010). All these studies show a rise in the return to AFQT in the rst 10 years in the
labor market, particularly for men without a college education.
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and regressing the outcome on schooling and veteran status:
wt    tw0 = (t    t0)S + tV + t    t0:
Note that when bbV 0 = 0 there is no measured ability dierence between veterans
and non-veterans, and dierent choices for the quasi-dierencing factor  t will
yield the same estimate of bt.18 In the analysis below we show that estimates ofbbV 0 for men who were working full time prior to the age of conscription are uni-
formly small and statistically insignicant, suggesting that the ability dierences
are negligible.
Despite the relatively small estimates of bbV 0 in our sample, when  is large
in magnitude the bias correction implied by equation (5) can be sizeable. It is
therefore interesting to ask what value of  is appropriate for our setting. Un-
fortunately, without additional restrictions the set of factor loadings, returns to
schooling, and returns to veteran status f t; t; tg are not identiable from the
2(T + 1) reduced-form regression coecients in equations (3) and (4). One po-
tential set of identifying assumptions is that the returns to schooling and veteran
status are both constant over time (i.e., t = 0 =  and t = ): In this case, if
there are at least two post-conscription periods with dierent  0ts (both not equal
to 1); it is possible to obtain estimates of the loading factors and the veteran eect
 using the relative changes in the reduced form eects of schooling and veteran
status between periods. In the Portuguese context there is considerable evidence
that the return to education has risen over the past two decades (e.g., Centeno
and Novo, 2009). Moreover, existing research suggests that the premium for vet-
eran service may change with age or experience (e.g., Angrist, 1990 and Angrist
and Chen, 2011). Thus, we do not pursue this identication strategy here.
An alternative identication strategy uses the second moments of the reduced
form errors in equations (3) and (4):
vt =  t + t t = 0; 1; :::T
with  0 = 1 (see Lemieux, 1998). This "one factor" model implies a highly
restrictive covariance structure:
var[vt] = ( t)
2var[] + var[t]
cov[vt; vs] =  t svar[] + cov[t; s]:
Given a data generating process for the transitory shocks t and a parametric
shape for the time path of the loading factors, the key parameters  t can be
estimated by minimum distance methods from the observed covariances of the
18In the case where bbV 0 = 0 dierent choices for  will lead to identical estimates for t but the
sampling error will vary with the choice of  :Assuming bbV 0 = 0 the most ecient choice for  is the
estimated coecient of w0 from an OLS regression of wt on S, V; and w0:
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUECAN COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE RAISE CIVILIAN WAGES?13
reduced form wage residuals bvt (t = 0; 1::::T ). In the Appendix we describe how
we apply this procedure to obtain estimates of the  0ts for the men in our sample
of veterans and nonveterans who were working at age 20/21. In brief, we assume
that the transitory shocks t are generated by a stationary rst-order autogressive
process, with an arbitrary initial condition. We also assume that  t rises linearly
for t years, and then stabilizes:
 t = 1 + gt 0  t  t
=  = 1 + gt t > t:
This path is roughly consistent with the path implied by standard learning models
(e.g., Farber and Gibbons, 1996), assuming that learning is completed after t
years.19 Some experimentation revealed that a value of t equal to 14 years yields
the best t to the data, and leads to a value of  = 2:62 (standard error = 0:16),
which is comparable to the estimate obtained by Schoenberg (2007) for the rise
in returns to AFQT. The estimated variance components imply that 78 percent
of the variance in pre-conscription wages is attributable to the transitory shock,
and that the transitory wage shocks have a rst-order autocorrelation coecient
of 0:72.
Although models like (1) and (2) are widely used in the program evaluation
literature, there are a number of concerns with a simple dierence-in-dierences
framework for measuring the eect of conscription in Portugal. One is that vet-
eran status may be correlated with both the permanent component of ability
and the transitory error in pre-conscription earnings. In this case, veterans and
non-veterans with similar per-conscription wages would not be expected to follow
the same wage trajectory in the absence of a true service eect. One way to
test whether veteran status is independent of the transitory wage component is
to examine a longer series of pre-conscription earnings, and look for a "dip" or
"surge" in wages just prior to conscription (e.g., Ashenfelter, 1978, Ashenfelter
and Card, 1985). As we show below, wages of the conscipts and non-conscripts
follow very similar trends in the three years prior to conscription, providing no
evidence that men with temporarily low (or high) wages were more likely to be
conscripted.
| Figure 2 here |
A second concern is that wages of young workers in Portugal may be relatively
uninformative about long run ability dierences because of institutional forces
that compress wage dierentials at the low end of the wage distribution { speci-
cally, mandatory coverage by sectoral bargaining contracts, and a high minimum
wage (see for example, Cardoso, 1998; Cardoso and Portugal 2005; Centeno and
Novo, 2009). Despite these institutional forces, wages at age 20/21 are highly
19Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Schoenberg (2007) consider models in which the return to AFQT is
allowed to rise linearly with experience, and also consider quadratic models.
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predictive of wages later in life for the men in our sample. This fact is illustrated
in Figure 2, where we plot mean log wages in 2002-2009 against mean log wages
at age 20-21 for the men in 100 "percentile groups", classied by the value of
their pre-conscription wages. (We use the combined sample of 6,749 conscripts
and non-conscripts described in column 3 of Table 2 to construct the gure). Two
features are notable in this graph. The rst is that hourly wages at age 20/21 are
relatively disperse. In particular, less than 2 percent of workers earn the hourly
equivalent of the national minimum wage at age 20/21, and there are no other
large "spikes" in the distribution, so intial wages for all 100 percentile groups are
distinct.20 A second observation is that the relationship between wages at 20/21
and average wages in mid-career is quite strong. The correlation across percentile
groups is 0.87, implying that three-quarters of the variation in average wages at
ages 35-42 for groups of size n  67 can be predicted from average wages at age
20/21.21
V. The Eect of Conscription on Subsequent Wages
Graphical Overview
To set the stage for our main results it is helpful to begin with a graphical
overview of the wage and employment outcomes of early labor market entrants
who were either conscripted or not conscripted. Figure 3a plots the wage proles
for the two groups. In this graph, and in our subsequent regression models, we
classify observations by the calendar year of observation in the QP, and report
mean log wages for all observations with a wage in that year. Note that the
absence of data for 1990 and 2001 creates "holes" in the proles in these years.
Taking account of these gaps we have up to three years of pre-conscription wage
data (in 1986, 1987, and 1988)22 and up to 18 years of post-conscription data (for
1991 to 2009).
Examination of the wage series in Figure 3a shows that the pre-conscription
wage proles are very similar for the two groups, with a small positive wage
advantage for conscripts in each year. In particular the wage proles are virtu-
ally parallel and show no evidence of a pre-treatment dip or surge for conscripts
relative to those who were not conscripted. This pattern is consistent with the
assumption that selection into the military was driven by the permanent char-
acteristics of workers, rather than the transitory wage outcome at age 20 or 21.
20Minimum wage legislation in Portugal species a minimum for monthly earnings: about 7 percent
of the sample are recorded as earning the minimum monthly earnings for 1988. However, there is some
variation in hours per month (corresponding to 8, 8.5, or 9 hours per day, for example), which smooths
out the mass at the minimum of monthly earnings.
21As discussed in the Appendix, the slope of the relationship in Figure 2 between average wages at ages
35-42 and pre-conscription wages (which is 0.53) is nearly identical to the slope predicted by the simple
model we use to obtain an estimate of the loading factors  t at dierent ages, providing a validation test
for that model.
22Recall that conscripts are men who worked in 1987 and were on leave in 1988 and 1989, or worked in
1988 and were on leave in 1989. We only have a 1988 wage observation for those in the latter category.
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In 1991, the rst year of the post-service period, the two groups again have very
similar wages. Thereafter, wages of the conscripts are uniformly above those of
the non-conscripts, with a 1-3 percentage point gap between 1992 and 2000 (ages
27-33) and a relatively steady 3-point gap between 2002 and 2009 (ages 34 to 42).
Figures 3b and 3c present the corresponding wage proles for two subgroups:
"low education" men with no more than 4 years of schooling at age 20/21 (23
percent of whom are veterans); and "high education" group with 6 or more years
of schooling (31 percent of whom are veterans). For both education groups the
pre-conscription wage proles of veterans and non-veterans are very similar, with
less than a 1 percent wage gap between them in any year. In the immediate
post-service years the low-educated veterans have very similar wages to their
non-veteran counterparts. By 2002, however, the veterans have systematically
higher wages, with a gap of about 5 percent at the end of our sample period.
Among the high-educated group veterans and non-veterans have very similar
wages throughout the period from 1991 to 2000 (ages 23-33) and only very slightly
higher average wages in the last years of our sample.
| Figure 3 here |
A potential issue with the wage comparisons in Figures 3a-3c is that the frac-
tions of conscripts and non-conscripts who are observed with a wage may be
dierent at a given age, leading to potential selectivity biases in the observed
wage gaps. Figures 4a-4c plot the age proles of the probability of appearing as a
wage-earner in the QP. All three graphs show that the conscript group had some-
what higher employment rates than the non-conscripts in the two earliest years
(1986 and 1987). The situation is reversed in 1988 and 1989, however, since by
construction the men we classify as non-veterans were working in 1988 and 1989,
whereas the men we classify as veterans were all on leave in 1989 (20 percent were
also on leave in 1988).
In the years immediately following their military service the conscripts as a
whole have slightly lower employment rates than the non-conscripts (e.g., a gap
of -3.6 percentage points in 1991, and a gap of -1.9 points in 1997). After 2002 the
gaps are uniformly small (under 1 percentage point in magnitude). For the less-
educated subgroup (Figure 4b) the employment gaps vary a little more over time,
but are never larger than 3 percentage points in absolute value. For the more-
educated subgroup (Figure 4c) the employment gaps are a little larger between
1991 and 1999, but are very small after 2001. These patterns suggest that wage
comparisons between conscripts and non-conscripts under the age of 30 have
to be interpreted cautiously, since the conscript group has a somewhat lower
employment rate in this age range, potentially inducing a selectivity bias. After
age 35, however, there is less concern about selectivity.
| Figure 4 here |
In the online Appendix we present an extended series of graphical comparisons
that supplement the ndings in Figures 3 and 4. First, we show the age proles
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of wages and employment for women born in 1967 who meet the same criteria
as our conscript and non-conscript groups. Female "conscripts" are presumably
women who took maternity leave at ages 21 and/or 22, while "non-conscripts" are
women who worked continuously at those ages. Consistent with other evidence
on the costs of child-bearing (e.g., Light and Ureta, 1995), we nd that women
who take leave at a young age tend to have lower wages later in their careers
than those who did not. The gap is particularly pronounced for higher-educated
women, as might be expected if career interruptions have a higher cost for them.
Employment rates of women who took leave in their early 20's are also lower
than the rates for those who did not. The negative impacts of leave-taking for
young women contrast with the generally positive wage eects (and 0 employment
eects) for men, and conrms that there is not a simple mechanical explanation
for the male eects.
We also present graphs showing the wage and employment outcomes for all
four groups of early labor market entrants dened in Table 2 (i.e., our two main
groups of conscripts and non-conscripts, plus men who were missing from the
QP at age 22, and the residual group). Generally speaking, the wages of all four
groups are fairly similar, though the residual group tends to have slightly lower
wages than the other three. The employment rates of the groups vary more - in
particular, as noted in the discussion of Table 2, the group who were not in the
QP in 1989 have substantially lower employment rates at all ages than those who
were recorded as unpaid leave in that year. We interpret this as supporting the
logic of our classication scheme, which treats being "on leave" as fundamentally
dierent from being absent altogether from the survey.
Regression Models
In this section we present our main estimation results for models of the eect
of conscription on post-conscription earnings. We begin in Table 3 with results
for the wage on the job held immediately prior to conscription (i.e., the wage
w0, measured at age 20 or 21). The model in column (1) is t to our entire
sample of conscripts and non-conscripts, and shows a small positive wage gap
between conscripts and non-conscripts, consistent with the results in Figure 3a.
The model in column (2) adds a set of dummies for education (measured at
age 20/21). Since conscripts are somewhat better educated than non-conscripts,
and better-educated workers tend to earn more, the addition of these controls
leads to a small negative estimate of the pre-conscription wage gap. Columns
3-6 show parallel sets of models for men with lower education at age 20/21, and
those with higher education. In both subgroups conscripts have lower wages than
non-conscripts, though the gaps after controlling for education are small and
statistically insignicant.23
23We have also t models that include a dummy indicating whether the pre-conscription wage is
measured in 1988 (versus 1987). For the overall sample this variable has a coecient of 0.044 suggesting
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| Table 3 here |
Based on the evidence in Figures 3a-3c and the regression results in Table 3, we
conclude that the pre-conscription wages for conscripts and non-conscripts who
were working full time at age 20/21 are very similar. As discussed above, in this
situation alternative values for the parameter  t in equation (5) or (6) will yield
similar estimates of the eect of conscription on subsequent wages, though with
larger values of  t the adjustment for the pre-conscription wage gap can be 2-3
times as large as the initial wage gap. Our approach is to summarize the results
using a range of values of  t from 0 to our estimate of  = 2:62: Of particular
interest is the case of  t = 1, which corresponds to a conventional dierence-in-
dierences estimate. Another useful benchmark is the value of  t that arises from
an OLS regression of wt on the pre-conscription wage w0 (controlling for initial
schooling).24
Table 4 summarizes the estimated veteran eects associated with the various
choices for the quasi-dierencing factor  t: Given the relative stability of the wage
gaps at dierent ages in Figures 3a-3c, we simplify the presentation by focusing
on pooled models that combine wages in two sub-periods: the years from 1991 to
2000, which represents the rst decade after completion of military service by the
conscripts; and the years from 2002 to 2009, which represents the "mid-career"
period for men born in 1967. More detailed year-by-year results are reported in
the online Appendix.
| Table 4 here |
The rst panel of Table 4 shows results for the overall sample. For the 1991-2000
period, the estimation results show a small eect that is within a standard error
of 0 for all values of the quasi-dierencing factor. For the later period the average
eect is 2.1 percent with no control for pre-enlistment wages, 2.1 percent when
the pre-enlistment wage is entered freely in the regression model (its estimated
coecient is 0.36), 2.0 percent when wages in all periods are dierenced from the
pre-enlistment wage, and 1.9 percent when we quasi-dierence using a factor of
2.62. The stability of the estimates across dierent values of the dierencing factor
is illustrated in Figure 5a, where we plot the estimated enlistment eect for 2002-
2009 against various values for the quasi-dierencing factor, ranging from 0 to 3,
as well as the pointwise 95 percent condence intervals. Though the estimates
from higher values of the quasi-dierencing factor are relatively imprecise, the
point estimates are essentially invariant to the value of the quasi-dierencing
factor, reecting the very small gap in pre-conscription wages between conscripts
that wages were about 4 percent higher if measured in 1988. The addition of this variable leads to an
estimated conscription dummy of 0.47 percent (standard error = 0.71). In the robustness section below
we discuss results where we inate pre-conscription wages by 4.4 percent if measured in 1987.
24Assuming that the pre-conscription wages of veterans and non-veterans are equal, a model with
pre-conscription wages as a control variable will yield the most ecient estimate of the veteran eect
(i.e., the estimate with the smallest standard error).
18 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
and non-conscripts who are observed with at least one wage in the 2002-2009
period.
The middle and lower panels of Table 4 report a parallel series of models esti-
mated for the subsets of men with lower or higher levels of education just prior to
enlistment. As suggested by the wage proles in Figure 3b, the average veteran
eect for less educated men in the rst decade after service is very close to zero.
In the 2002-2009 period, however, the eect is around 4 percent, and is statisti-
cally signicant at conventional levels for the models with  t  1. For the more
educated subgroup the wage eects of conscription are never large or signicant,
and the estimates for 2002-2009 are very close to 0. The patterns of the estimated
veteran eects on mid-career wages for dierent values of the quasi-dierencing
factor are summarized in Figures 5b and 5c. As in the overall sample, the esti-
mated wage eects are quite robust, reecting the fact that enlistment status is
nearly uncorrelated with pre-enlistment wages.
| Figure 5 here |
Assuming that pre-conscription wages are orthogonal to enlistment status,
the decision of which particular value of  t to use in the estimation of post-
conscription treatment eects can be based on eciency considerations. Under
orthogonality between ability and enlistment status, a simple OLS regression on
schooling, initial wages, and enlistment status provides the least-variance esti-
mates. We therefore focus on this specication { i.e., the estimates presented in
column 3 of Table 4 { as the basis for our "preferred" estimates.
Robustness Checks
Our analysis so far has focused on comparisons between two subgroups of men
who we can easily classify as either conscripts or non-conscripts. In this section
we consider the robustness of our conclusions to changes in the way that we dene
these two groups. The results are summarized in Table 5, where we show estimates
of the pooled enlistment eect for ages 35-42 from specications with dierent
quasi-dierencing factors, using alternative denitions of the conscripted and non-
conscripted groups. We show results for the overall sample in panel (a); results
for the low-education subgroup in panel (b); and results for the high-education
subgroup in panel (c).
| Table 5 here |
Focusing rst on the results in panel (a), the rst row shows the results from
our "baseline" sample denition (these are taken from the top panel of Table 4).
In row 2 we relax our denition of "early entrants" { which is based on full time
work at age 20 or 21 in our baseline samples { to include part time workers.25
25Thus, non-conscripts are dened as men who were observed working (with a valid wage) in 1988 and
1989, and conscripts are dened as men who either were working in March 1987 and on leave in March
1988 and 1989, or working in March 1988 and on leave in March 1989.
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This expands the sample by about 15 percent, and leads to estimates that are
slightly higher than our baseline estimates across the range of values for  t:
Our basic conscript denition includes two groups of men: those who were
working full time in March 1987 and on leave in the next two years; and those
who were working full time in March 1988 and on leave in the next year. Arguably,
the requirement that the rst group be on leave in both 1988 and 1989 may be too
strict, since some men may have been inducted in the early months of 1988 and
served only a year in the military. In row 3 we expand the denition of conscripts
to include men who were working full time in March 1987, on leave the next year,
and observed in any status in March 1989. This increases the conscript group by
about 40 percent, and has little impact on the estimates with no control for the
pre-conscription wage (columns 1-2) or with the pre-conscription wage included
as a regressor (columns 3-4). However, in the dierenced specication (columns
5-6) the alternative sample yields a somewhat larger estimate than the baseline
sample (3.8 percent versus 2.0 percent), and in the quasi-dierenced specication
with  t = 2:62, it yields a relatively large positive estimate (6.6 percent). This is
attributable to the fact that the pre-conscription wages of the added conscripts
(i.e., those who were working full time in March 1987, on leave in March 1988,
and not on leave in March 1989) are slightly lower than those of other groups, and
when 2:62w0 is subtracted from wages observed at later ages they appear to have
a signicant wage advantage. We interpret the large point estimate arising from
the quasi-dierenced model when this group is included as an "upper bound" on
the likely eect of conscription on the overall sample of men.
In row 4 we consider narrowing the conscript group from our baseline by impos-
ing the extra requirement that men who were working full time in March 1988 and
on leave in March 1989 also were working full time in March 1987. This reduces
the size of the conscript group by about 25 percent and leads to estimates that
are slightly larger in the specications that ignore the initial wage or include it
as a control, but slightly smaller in the specications with  t = 1 or  t = 2:62:
Finally, in row 5 we address a potential non-comparability between the way we
measure pre-conscription wages for men who served in the military and men who
did not. Recall that for non-veterans we use the wage in 1988 as our measure of
w0. For the 80 percent of conscripts who were working in 1988 and on leave in
1989 we do the same. But for the other 20 percent, who were working in 1987
and on leave in 1988 and 1989, we use the wage in 1987 as the measure of w0:
This may lead to some understatement of pre-conscription wage for the veterans.
As a check, we inated 1987 wages for the relevant subgroup by 4.4 percent (the
estimate that comes out of a model for pre-conscription wages that controls for
schooling and whether the wage was measured in 1987 or 1988). Applying the
adjustment leads to a slightly smaller estimate of the eect of veteran status on
wages at mid-career across the various specications.
Inspection the results in panels (b) and (c) shows that departures from our
baseline sample denition lead to estimated veteran eects for men with lower
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or higher education that are generally quite similar to our baseline estimates.
In particular, for the low education group the range of estimated veteran eects
is from 2.2 percent to 10 percent, with most of the estimates clustered in the
range from 4 percent to 6 percent. For the high-education group, by comparison,
the estimates range from -2.2 percent to 3.7 percent, with most of the estimates
clustered around 0.
Overall we interpret the robustness checks as providing general support for the
conclusions derived from our baseline sample. A caveat is that our use of pre-
enlistment wages to control for unobserved ability dierences between conscripts
and non-conscripts is relatively sensitive to the size of the pre-enlistment wage
gap { particularly when this gap is multiplied by a large value of  t: Empirically
the pre-conscription wage gaps are all relatively small. If one takes these gaps as
indicative that the true ability gap between conscripts and non-conscripts is 0,
then the most reliable estimates of the veteran eect emerge from models that use
the pre-conscription wage as a control variable. These models yield quite stable
and relatively precise estimates of the veteran eect, with a value of 4-5 percent
for low-education conscripts and approximately 0 for high-education conscripts.
Mechanisms
The estimates in Table 4 show a signicant but modestly-sized eect of con-
scription on the mid-career wages of low-educated men, coupled with a zero eect
on higher-educated men. In this section we briey discuss some of the possible
channels for the conscription eect, including education, labor market experience,
and location.
The models in Table 6 explore the potential role of education. Specically, these
models test whether military service had any eect on the rate of acquisition of
additional schooling between age 20 and 40. The sample includes conscripts
and non-conscripts who are observed working at least once between 2002 and
2009: we measure the change in education from age 20/21 to the last available
year in this period.26 On average the early labor market entrants in our sample
gained 0.77 years of education over their twenties and thirties. As shown in
column (1) of Table 6 the average gain is only slightly larger for the conscripts
(+0.07 years, standard error = 0.05). As might be expected, however, the gains
dier for men with diering levels of initial education, and since the conscripted
group under-represents both very low educated men, and those with the most
education, it is important to control for initial education in measuring the eect
of conscription. Adding these controls (column 2) leads to small but signicantly
positive enlistment eect (+0.14 years, t=2.64).
The remaining columns of Table 6 show parallel models for the subgroups with
less than 6 years of initial schooling and 6 or more years of initial education. In the
26Among men observed at least once in 2002-2009, 75 percent are last observed in 2009 and 90 percent
are observed in 2006 or later.
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low-education subgroup enlistees gain about 14 of a year more schooling than non-
enlistees, while in the high-education subgroup there is no eect of enlistment.
Assuming a return to education of about 8 percent in the Portuguese market in
the 2000s (which is the range that arises from a standard human capital earnings
function) this extra schooling would generate roughly 2 percentage points higher
wages for low-education veterans: enough to account for about half of the wage
advantage we estimate in Table 4b for these men.
| Table 6 here |
We conducted a similar analysis of cumulative labor market experience. As
might be expected given the very similar probabilities of employment of conscripts
and non-conscripts documented in Figures 4a-4c, however, cumulative labor mar-
ket experience of veterans and non-veterans increases at nearly the same rate for
the two groups. Thus, experience eects appear to play almost no role in the
emergence of a wage gap for veterans by mid-career.
Another possible channel for the wage eect of military service is through ge-
ographic location. About one-third of the Portuguese labor force works in the
Lisbon area, and wages are on average about 16 percent higher there. We con-
jectured that the experience of serving in the military could have some eect on
the willingness of men from small towns and rural areas to migrate to Lisbon.
Empirically, however, there is no evidence of dierential migration behavior, so
this channel cannot explain the veteran eect.
We also conducted an informal "accounting exercise" in which we compared
the measured veteran eect from a model with no additional controls, and models
with controls for industry and occupation. This exercise is similar to the "Oaxaca
decomposition" technique that is widely used to help understand gender and race-
related wage gaps (see Fortin, Lemieux, Firpo, 2011 for a recent discussion). We
nd that dierences in industry account for very little of the measured veteran
eect for low-education men, while dierences in occupation can account for about
one-half of the eect. The relatively higher fraction of veterans in higher-wage
occupations could be due in part to their relative gains in schooling, and also
other forms of vocational training that are not recorded in the QP data.
VI. Inter-cohort Comparisons
A limitation of the estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5 is they pertain to a
relatively narrow subset of men who were working by age 20 or 21. As a check
on the potential generalizeability of these results to the broader population, this
section briey discusses an alternative evaluation design that uses inter-cohort
comparisons in the conscription rate.
As noted in Table 1, the fraction of men who were conscripted varies by cohort,
with a range from 30 to 45 percent among cohorts who served for up to two
years in the military. Assuming that conscription rates are uncorrelated with
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other factors that inuence the long-run earnings of men in a given cohort, and
that conscription has a homogeneous eect, one could estimate the eect from a
simple regression of mean wages for the men in a cohort (observed at some range
of ages) on the fraction of the cohort who were conscripted. A problem for this
approach is that dierent cohorts are never observed at the same age in the same
year. Thus, some assumptions are needed to separately identify cohort, age, and
time eects. We assume that the eects of age on wages can be captured by a
(time-varying) smooth polynomial, and t models for log wages that include year
eects, a cubic in age (fully interacted with year) and unrestricted cohort eects:
(6) wict = a0t + a1t(t  c) + a2t(t  c)2 + a3t(t  c)3 + !c + eict;
where wict is the log wage of individual i born in year c and observed in year t;
fa0t; a1t; a2t; a3tg are the coecients of time-period-specic cubics in age, and !c
are cohort xed eects. We then relate the cohort eects to the fraction of the
cohort who served in the military (Vc) :
(7) !c = + Vc + ec:
We use wage data for the period from 2002-2009 for men born from 1955 to 1975,
but t the second stage model to the narrower set of cohorts born from 1959
to 1969. These cohorts served in the military from 1980 to 1990 under relatively
stable conditions, and were all subject to a maximum limit of two years of service.
The advantage of tting the rst step model to the broader set of cohorts is that
it provides a wider age range over which to estimate the age polynomials. To get
correct standard errors for the estimate of  we actually t a one-step model that
combines equations (6) and (7) and clusters the standard errors by birth year.27
| Figure 6 here |
Figure 6 shows the estimated cohort dummies obtained from equation (6), along
with the fraction of the cohort who served in the military. Inspection of the
graph suggests that cohort average wages and the fraction of conscripts are not
very strongly related, though the overall correlation is weakly positive. The one-
step estimate of  is 4.5 percent, with a standard error of 5 percent, providing
a relatively wide 95 percent condence interval for the cohort-wide conscription
eect that ranges from -5.5 percent to +9.5 percent. Our conclusion is that
the aggregate evidence is consistent with our main estimates for men who were
working prior to the age of conscription. Moreover, we can denitely rule out
large negative eects of mandatory military service for the cohort as a whole.
27We t a version of equation (6) that includes unrestricted cohort dummies for the oldest cohorts
(born 1955-58) and youngest cohorts (born 1970-75) and the fraction of conscripts for the cohorts born
from 1959 to 1969.
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VII. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we use detailed administrative data covering the entire private
sector of the Portuguese economy to study the long-term eects of peace-time
military service on men born in 1967 who were working prior to age 21, when
they were subject to mandatory conscription. We present a series of dierence-in-
dierences estimators that use pre-conscription wages to control for unobserved
ability dierences between veterans and non-veterans. Wages of veterans and
non-veterans track each other very closely in the years before conscription, and
mean wages of the two groups at the job held just before the determination of
conscription status are very similar (conditional on schooling), suggesting that the
two groups have very similar unobserved abilities. As a result, our estimates of
the long-run wage impacts of conscription are robust to alternative assumptions
about the evolution of ability-related wage dierences over the career.
We nd a small positive, but statistically insignicant impact of military service
on wages at mid-career (ages 35-42). This is similar to recent ndings on the
eects of peace-time conscription in Britain (Grenet, Hart and Roberts, 2011)
and West Germany (Bauer et al., forthcoming), and also to recent estimates of
the eect of military service on Vietnam era draftees at age 40 (Angrist, Chen and
Song, 2011). The small average eect, however, represents an average of a larger
positive eect for men with only a primary education (about one-half of the early
labor market entrants in the cohort) and a zero eect for better-educated men.
The positive impact on the low-educated subgroup is partially explained by the
fact that enlistees with initially low education acquire more education than non-
enlistees. They also work in somewhat better-paying industries and occupations.
We conjecture that the higher schooling and occupational outcomes may be due
to basic skills and occupational training received in the military, though we have
no direct data on the extent of this training. Low-educated veterans have, if
anything, slightly higher long-run probabilities of private sector employment than
non-veterans, providing no indication of the elevated criminal propensities found
by Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) for Argentine veterans.
Several features of the institutional setting may have contributed to the positive
impact of service for less-educated men in our sample. First, these men had at
most 4 years of schooling when they entered the military. A year of basic skills
training could have a potentially important impact on such men { allowing some
to achieve literacy, for example. Second, Portuguese law required rms to rehire
draftees at the completion of their service. This may have eased the transition
back to civilian life for the conscripts in our analysis, who all held full time jobs
just before entering the military. Third, it is important to emphasize that the
military service we study occurred during peacetime. Nevertheless, our ndings
are consistent with a stream of U.S. ndings, including de Tray (1982), Berger and
Hirsch (1983), Angrist (1998), and Hirsch and Mehay (2003) which suggest that
military service can have a positive wage impact for relatively disadvantaged men,
perhaps comparable in magnitude to the impact of other labor market training
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programs.
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Appendix A: Data
Dataset
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) data are gathered annually by the Portuguese Min-
istry of Employment. All rms with wage-earners are required to complete the
survey. Civil servants and household workers are excluded from coverage. The
coverage of agriculture is also relatively low, given its low share of wage-earners.
The mandatory nature of the survey leads to extremely high response rates, and
in recent years nearly all rms with wage-earners in manufacturing and services
are included in the data set. Nevertheless, there was some under-coverage {
particularly of very small rms{ in the initial years of the QP (Portugal, MTSS,
1990).
All personnel working in the rm in a reference week (in March until 1993 and
in October from 1994 onwards) are in-scope for the QP. Workers on short-term
leave (e.g., sickness, maternity leave, vacation, and strikes) and those on leave for
compulsory military service are also supposed to be reported. Appendix Table
A.1 claries the coding of leaves of absence during the period under analysis.
Reported data in the QP include the rm's location, industry, employment,
sales, ownership (private Portuguese-owned, private foreign-owned, or public-
owned), incorporation status, and the worker's gender, age, occupation, schooling,
date of hire, monthly earnings (split into several components), and hours of work.
Schooling information pertains to the highest completed level of education, with
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the following categories: rst cycle or primary education (4 years); second cycle
(6 years); third cycle (9 years); high school (12 years); university.28
Workers are assigned an identication number, based on a transformation of
the social security number, that enables tracking over time. Similarly, each rm
entering the database is assigned a unique identication number and it can be
followed over time. The Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a rm
that has already reported to the database is not assigned a dierent identication
number. Most of these routines are based on the detailed location of the company
and its legal identication codes.
Merging data across years
We combine QP data for the period from 1986 to 2009. The following data
checks and selection procedures were implemented to prepare a worker-level data
set to be merged across years.
Selection of valid worker identication codes: Observations with missing or
invalid worker identication codes have been dropped. This restriction led to
dropping an average 5.5 percent percent of the observations in the original yearly
data sets made available by the Ministry of Employment.
Handling of duplicate worker identication codes in a given year : Only workers
whose identication number appears at a maximum of two dierent rms are
included in the annual le we use to build a longitudinal le. This allows workers
to have a maximum of two jobs during the reference week. In the case of a
duplicate observation in any year, we also checked that the worker's gender, date
of birth, and schooling were the same in both jobs { otherwise the observations
were dropped. On average 0.6 percent of the original observations in the annual
QP les are dropped because the worker appeared at 3 or more rms; 2.7 percent
of the observations were dropped because the worker appeared at two rms but
had dierent gender, age or schooling in the two jobs; and 0.1 percent of the
observations were dropped because the worker was reported twice by the same
rm.
After these data checks, on average 91 percent of the observations in the original
yearly data sets are retained, yielding an initial panel of 50,847,109 person-year
observations on 7,963,035 workers.
Checks on the consistency of the longitudinal data
We imputed age and/or schooling to missing observations whenever there was
no obvious inconsistency in the reported values.29 These imputations aected 1.2
28Since the mid-1990s, these categories, and in particular the two highest categories, are further
subdivided.
29If schooling was consistently reported (possibly increasing over time) and the values it achieved
before and after a missing year were the same, the missing value was corrected; similarly, missings in the
initial/nal period(s) were extrapolated from the earliest/latest reported value.
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percent and 0.9 percent of the observations in the initial panel, respectively for
age and schooling.
Inconsistencies were identied if the worker's gender or date of birth was re-
ported as changing, or if the highest schooling level was reported as decreasing
over time. In such cases, the value reported in over 50 percent of the non-missing
records was treated as the correct value (if there was such a value). Using this
procedure, 0.8 percent, 2.5 percent and 7.7 percent of the observations in the
initial panel were corrected for inconsistencies in reported gender, birth date and
education, respectively. In cases where no value was reported more than half the
time, the individual was dropped from the panel. Overall, 1.5 percent, 0.8 percent
and 6.2 percent of the observations are dropped due to inconsistent information
on gender, birth date or schooling, respectively.
Finally, any remaining workers with missing age or schooling were dropped (0.3
percent and 1.7 percent of the initial panel, respectively).
The nal panel data set includes 45,511,769 person-year observations for 7,159,178
workers: this represents approximately 90 percent of the initial panel.
A nal set of checks on the longitudinal data concentrated on the date of hire
information. Dates of hire later than the date of the survey reference week were
considered as mistakes and recoded to missing (aecting 3.8 percent of the ob-
servations). Missing information on date of hire was imputed whenever it was
consistently reported for other years in the spell (aecting 4.6 percent of the ob-
servations). When the information was reported inconsistently across years, the
date of hire reported more than one-half the time was taken as the correct one,
leading to corrections for 2.1 percent of the observations. If after these corrections
a worker had two or more dates of hire within the same employment spell the
rst reported date was considered the correct date (correcting 0.9 percent of the
observations). Workers with inconsistent data after the introduction of the pre-
vious corrections were assigned missing information on date of hire (0.1 percent
of the observations).
Sources of Information on Military Service
In the text and tables we present information on various aspects of military
service. Our primary sources for this information are as follows:
On regulations governing military service:
 Portugal. Assembleia da Republica (1987). Law 30/87, July 7.
 Portugal. Assembleia da Republica (1991). Law 22/91, June 19.
 Portugal. Ministerio da Defesa Nacional (1988). Decree-law 463/88, De-
cember 15.
 Portugal. Preside^ncia da Republica (1968). Law 2135, July 11.
On the recording of men in military service in the QP:
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 Portugal. Ministerio do Trabalho (1980). Decree-law 380/80, September
17.
On the number of conscripted:
 Portugal. Estado Maior do Exercito (1980-1999).
Appendix B: Estimation of Covariance Model for Wage Residuals
In this appendix we discuss our methods for estimating the parameters  t.
The reduced form wage residuals for individual i in period t are assumed to be
generated by the model:
vit =  ti + it t = 0; 1; :::T
with  0 = 1: Under this model the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals
has elements:
var[vit] = ( t)
22 + var[it]
cov[vit; vis] =  t s
2
 + cov[it; is];
where 2 = var[i] is the variance of the permanent ability component. We
assume that the transitory shocks t are generated by a stationary rst-order
autoregressive process:









To allow for additional potential non-stationarity at the start of the work-life, we
also assume that the pre-conscription wage residual contains an additive compo-
nent:
vi0 = i + i0 + i0;
where var[i0] = 
2
; and i0 is uncorrelated with i or the sequence of transitory
shocks. Finally we assume that  t rises linearly for t = 14 years, and thereafter
remains constant:
 t = 1 + gt 0  t  14
=  = 1 + gt t > 14:
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Under these assumptions the 190 elements of the 19  19 variance covariance
matrix of the wage residuals for the pre-conscription wage w0 and the post-
conscription wages in 1991-2000 plus 2002-2009 can be written as a function
of underlying parameter vector  = f  ; 2; 2 ; 20; 2; g: Letting
bmist = bvitbvis
represent the product of the estimated reduced form errors for individual i in






where Nst is the number of observations with observed wages in periods s and t:
Let bm = vec[bmst]: Our model assumes that in the absence of sampling error the
elements of m will depend on the parameters  :
m = f():
We choose  to minimize the sum of squared residuals [bm f()]0[bm f()]; and use
standard formulas to construct a matrix of sampling errors for the corresponding







We used these parameters to simulate wage data for a set of 6700 people over
the same horizon as our sample (i.e., for the initial wage observation, and for the
post-conscription period from 1991 to 2009) and assumed that 28 percent of the
data were missing at random in each year from 2002-2009. We then divided the
sample into 100 percentile groups based on the initial (pre-conscription) wage,
and constructed an average wages over the 2002-2009 period for each percentile
group. Finally, we regressed the mean 2002-2009 wage for each percentile group
on their average pre-conscription wage and obtained a regression coecient of
0:54 with R2 = 0:88: This compares to the actual data in Figure 2 which yields
a regression coecient of 0:53 and R2 = 0:77:
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Table 1|Cohort Size, Age of Conscription, Conscription Rate, and Maximum Length of Ser-
vice
Number Age of Number of Men Maximum
of Men in Cohort Conscription Conscripted Percent of Men Length of
Year of (1000's) for Cohort (1000's) Conscripted Service (mo.)
Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1959 109.7 21 35.5 32.4 24
1960 110.5 21 33.1 30.0 24
1961 111.9 21 30.7 27.5 24
1962 113.8 21 34.2 30.0 24
1963 109.5 21 39.1 35.7 24
1964 112.4 21 38.3 34.1 24
1965 108.6 21 36.4 33.6 24
1966 107.2 21 36.8 34.3 24
1967 103.9 21 40.9 39.3 24
1968 101.1 21 39.3 38.8 24
1969 98.1 21 34.0 34.7 24
1970 89.2 21 41.9 46.9 8
1971 97.3 21 37.1 38.1 8
1972 90.3 21 41.9 23.4 4
1973 88.7 20 4
1974 88.1 20 40.0 45.4 4
1975 93.1 20 43.7 46.9 4
1976 96.6 20 36.6 37.9 4
1977 94.0 20 29.4 31.3 4
1978 87.1 20 29.2 33.6 4
1979 82.7 20 28.9 35.0 4
Note: Column (1) is number of men born in indicated year. Column (2) is legal age of conscription.
Column (3) is number of men conscripted into the army in the year the cohort turned 21 (born 1972 or
earlier) or 20 (born 1973 or later). Number conscripted excludes a small number of men conscripted into
the airforce and navy. Men born in 1972 and 1973 were both conscripted in 1993, and entry in column
(3) is total for both cohorts. Column (4) represents the ratio of column (3) to column (1): for the cohorts
born in 1972 and 1973 we assume equal conscription rates. Column (5) is the maximum length of service.
Source: See Data Appendix for sources.
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Table 2|Summary Statistics on Sub-Groups of Male Cohort Born 1967
Early Entrants (Working Full-Time in 1987 or 1988) Not
Full Conscripted Early
Cohort Total Yes/No Yes No Missing Residual Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of observations 86.909 18.517 6.749 1.838 4.911 9.502 2.266 68.392
Pre-conscription:
Share w/ observed wage
1986 14,1 46,6 51,4 62,1 47,4 39,9 61,0 5,3
1987 16,5 72,3 66,4 77,5 62,3 71,5 93,2 1,4
1988 15,5 68,0 95,0 81,5 100,0 58,9 25,7 1,2
1989 13,2 36,7 72,8 0,0 100,0 0,0 82,9 6,8
Share on leave absence
1986 0,5 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,3 1,0 1,4 0,4
1987 0,6 0,9 1,5 1,4 1,6 0,6 0,2 0,5
1988 2,1 6,0 5,0 18,5 0,0 3,3 19,8 1,1
1989 3,4 11,8 27,2 100,0 0,0 0,0 15,0 1,2
(Log) real hourly wage
1986 0,60 0,61 0,62 0,63 0,61 0,60 0,62 0,58
1987 0,78 0,78 0,79 0,80 0,78 0,77 0,78 0,78
1988 0,84 0,84 0,85 0,86 0,85 0,83 0,88 0,83
1989 0,91 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,93 0,90
Schooling:
Share <=4 years at entry 40,8 53,7 53,2 46,4 55,8 53,9 54,5 37,3
Av. at entry labor market 6,9 5,3 5,3 5,5 5,3 5,3 5,2 7,3
Av. in 2002 7,1 5,8 5,8 6,0 5,8 5,8 5,7 7,5
Post-conscription:
Share w/ wage obs, 02-09 60,9 62,2 72,6 72,4 72,7 52,4 72,0 60,6
(Log) real hr wage, 02-09 1,66 1,54 1,55 1,57 1,54 1,55 1,52 1,71
Note: Early entrants are dened as men who were observed working full time in either 1987 or 1988.
Conscripted men include men who were working full time in 1987, and were on leave of absence (listed
on the roster of employees with missing values for wages and hours) in 1988 and 1989, plus men who
were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working
full time in 1988 and 1989. Missing group in column 6 are those who were working full time in 1987 or
1988 and are not present in the QP in 1989. Residual group in column 7 are all men who were working
full time in 1987 or 1988 and are not included as conscripts, non-conscripts, or missing. Share with wage
observation(s), 2002-2009 refers to the fraction of the group indicated in the column heading who were
observed as wage earners in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
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Table 3|Estimated Effect of Conscription on Log of Pre-Conscription Wages
All Low-Education High-Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscription Dummy (coecient100) 0.17 -0.36 -0.28 -0.28 -1.02 -0.43
(0.68) (0.66) (0.88) (0.88) (1.01) (0.99)
Schooling at Age 20/21 (coef. X 100)
Primary schooling (4 years) -0.20 -0.22
(2.17) (2.00)
Lower intermediate (6 years) 4.45
(2.19)
Intermediate (9 years) 18.18 13.73
(2.36) (1.21)
Secondary (12 years) 21.32 16.86
(2.57) (1.69)
Number of Observations 6,749 3,496 3,253
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is log of hourly wage at age 20/21. For
conscripts wage is measured on last job held before service. For nonconscripts wage is measured on
job in 1988. Years of completed schooling are taken from employer report for job that is taken as
pre-conscription job. Omitted category is less than primary schooling. See text for further details.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
Table 4|Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription from Alternative Models
OLS, No Control OLS, Control Di. Model: Quasi-Di. Model:
for Wage at for Wage at Wage Minus Wage Wage - 2.62 Wage
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 at Age 20/21 at Age 20/21
Consc. Std. Consc. Std. Consc. Std. Consc. Std.
Eect Err. Eect Err. Eect Err. Eect Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Overall Sample
Pooled 1991-2000 1.1 (0.9) 0.9 (0.8) 0.6 (0.9) -0.2 (2.0)
Pooled 2002-2009 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (2.3)
b) Low Education
Pooled 1991-2000 0.6 (1.2) 0.6 (1.1) 0.7 (1.3) 0.8 (2.7)
Pooled 2002-2009 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.5 (3.2)
c) High Education
Pooled 1991-2000 1.5 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -1.1 (2.8)
Pooled 2002-2009 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.1 (3.1)
Note: Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors clustered by person in parenthesis). Pooled
estimates use sample of available person-year observations and include dummies for year and for education
as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns
5-6 use as dependent variable wage at indicated year, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8
use as dependent variable wage at indicated year minus 2.62 times wage at age 20/21.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
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Table 5|Robustness Checks: Estimated Wage Effects of Conscription for Years 2002-2009
from Alternative Models
OLS, No Control OLS, Control Di. Model: Quasi-Di. Model:
for Wage at for Wage at Wage Minus Wage Wage - 2.62 Wage
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 at Age 20/21 at Age 20/21
Consc. Std. Consc. Std. Consc. Std. Consc. Std.
Eect Err. Eect Err. Eect Err. Eect Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Overall Sample
1) Baseline 2,1 (1,2) 2,1 (1,2) 2,0 (1,3) 1,9 (2,3)
2) Relax full-time 2,5 (1,2) 2,7 (1,1) 2,9 (1,2) 3,6 (2,2)
3) Relax leave in 1989 2,1 (1,1) 2,8 (1,1) 3,8 (1,2) 6,6 (2,0)
4) Impose f-time 1987 3,0 (1,4) 2,6 (1,3) 1,9 (1,5) 0,0 (2,5)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 2,1 (1,2) 1,7 (1,2) 1,2 (1,3) -0,3 (2,3)
b) Low Education
1) Baseline 4,1 (1,7) 4,1 (1,6) 4,3 (1,8) 4,5 (3,2)
2) Relax full-time 4,1 (1,6) 4,3 (1,5) 4,9 (1,7) 6,1 (3,1)
3) Relax leave in 1989 3,8 (1,4) 4,6 (1,4) 6,2 (1,5) 10,0 (2,8)
4) Impose f-time 1987 5,4 (1,9) 5,1 (1,9) 4,5 (2,1) 3,1 (3,7)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 4,1 (1,7) 3,8 (1,6) 3,3 (1,8) 2,2 (3,2)
c) High Education
1) Baseline 0,5 (1,8) 0,4 (1,7) 0,3 (1,9) -0,1 (3,1)
2) Relax full-time 1,3 (1,7) 1,4 (1,7) 1,4 (1,8) 1,5 (3,1)
3) Relax leave in 1989 0,7 (1,6) 1,2 (1,6) 1,9 (1,7) 3,7 (2,8)
4) Impose f-time 1987 1,2 (1,9) 0,6 (1,9) -0,1 (2,0) -2,2 (3,4)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 0,5 (1,8) 0,1 (1,7) -0,5 (1,9) -2,2 (3,1)
Note: In the baseline sample, conscripts include men who were working full time in 1987 and on leave
in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted
men are those who were working full time in 1988 and 1989. Sample in rows 2 replaces full time work
requirements for both groups with requirement that the individual be working and have a valid wage.
Sample in rows 3 modies conscript denition to include men who were working full time in 1987 and
on leave in 1988, plus men who were working full time in 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus dropping the
requirement that the men who worked full time in 1987 were also on leave in 1989. Sample in rows 4
modies conscript denition to include men who were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and
1989, plus men who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988 and on leave in 1989, thus limiting
the second group to those who were working full time in both 1987 and 1988. Sample in rows 5 is same
as baseline. However, wages of conscripts who were working full time in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and
1989 are inated by 4.4%. Estimated coecients times 100 (with standard errors in parentheses). All
models include dummies for year and education as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 4-5 include wage
measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 6-7 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 8-9 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus 2.62
times wage at age 20/21. Estimates use sample of available person-year observations. Standard errors
are clustered by person.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
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Table 6|Change in Education
All Low-Education High-Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscription Dummy 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Schooling at Age 20/21:
Less than primary schooling 2.54 1.80
(0.21) (0.2)
Primary schooling (4 years) 0.76
(0.11)
Lower intermediate (6 years) 0.30 0.31
(0.12) (0.1)
Intermediate (9 years) 0.29 0.30
(0.14) (0.12)
Mean 0.77 1.04 0.50
Standard Deviation 1.68 1.86 1.43
Obs. 4,903 2,459 2,444
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes conscripts and nonconscripts who were observed
working as a wage earner in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009. Dependent variable is change in
schooling from last observed value (in 2002-2009 period) to initial value at age 20/21. Omitted category
is completed secondary schooling (12 years).
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).
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cohort 1967, males
not empl. priv. sector on leave
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cohort 1977, males
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cohort 1967, females
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cohort 1987, males
not empl. priv. sector on leave
full−timer part−timer
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cohort 1987, females
not empl. priv. sector on leave
full−timer part−timer
owner unpaid family, etc
Note: For the 1967 cohort (rst row), military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21
(thus observed the year before, at age 20 or 19 depending on the date of birth) and service lasted for
24 months; for the 1977 cohort (second row), enlistment was due the year the individual turned 20 and
service lasted for 4 months; for the 1987 cohort (third row), military enlistment had been abolished and
the plot is conditional on working full-time the year the individual turned 20.
Sources: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).































Mean Log Wage at Age 20/21
Note: each point in the graph is a percentile group (based on wages at age 20/21) and includes about 67 workers.  




























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).




























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).




























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).




























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).



























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).




























Note: Conscripted is an individual working full-time in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the
years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full-time during the
years military enlistment is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the
individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24 months.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).




Figure 5: Estimated Impact of Enlistment on Wages at Ages 35!42 !! Quasi!differenced Model 
with Alternative Values of the Differencing Factor














































































Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).











































































Fraction Conscripted (left scale)
Age-adjusted Mean Cohort Wage (right scale)
Source: Computations based on Portugal - MTSS (1986-2009), Baganha and Marques (2001), and
Portugal - Estado Maior do Exercito ( 1980-1999).
